(1) The idea that the 'willing suspension of disbelief' must have some role to play in the analysis of our response to fiction is a familiar one, endorsed in one form or another by a good many people. One of the main points in its favour is, it seems, that it helps us to resolve, or dissolve, a puzzle allegedly raised by that response to fiction: unless disbelief were suspended, we could not avoid the puzzle resulting from being moved by what we do not believe ever really happened or ever existed. I want to suggest, however, that the notion of suspension of disbelief cannot coherently be used to explain or account for our reactions to fictional characters and events, and that in any case it is unnecessary to the solution of the alleged paradox. I take fiction here to cover art works in which a story is told, presented or represented, i.e., novels, short stories, plays, certain kinds of paining and sculpture and dance-any works in fact in connection with which it makes sense to speak of characters appearing and events taking place in them.
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(2) The puzzle which suspension of disbelief is called in to resolve must be supposed to arise in this way. In the general context of belief and emotional responses, two things seem uncontroversial: (A) knowing entails believing, and (B) an emotional response presupposes some beliefs (whether true or false) about that to which one responds. (Whatever dispute there may be on point (A) is irrelevant to this discussion.)
Clearly we know of at least some characters in fiction that their counterparts in real life do not exist and never have existed, and that the events in which they are caught up never occurred. And so we must have beliefs to that effect (from A); yet we are, at least sometimes, genuinely moved by these characters and what happens to them, and so it appears (from B) we must hold beliefs that certain people are caught up in certain events-beliefs which are as a matter of fact false. So long, then, as we maintain both (A) and (B) it seems that either we are committed to holding contradictory beliefs about characters and events in fiction or we must deny that we can, logically, be moved by fictional events or characters. That people can hold contradictory beliefs is not of course in itself all that puzzling. But the kind of cases we might think of do not seem to fit here.
It would be altogether too unsatisfactory an account of our response to fiction to settle simply for an account in terms of contradictory beliefs. On the other hand to deny that we can be moved by fictional events flies in the face of what we might call the facts of experience: that sometimes we undoubtedly are deeply moved.
(3) The second alternative certainly has its attractions. It could be argued, for example, that since (A) and (B) are clearly correct, then appearance to the contrary the fact of common experience, that we are sometimes moved by characters and events in fiction, is not a fact, or at least that what 'being moved by characters and events in fictions' purports to indicate must be misdescribed: we are not really moved. For whatever the nature of our response to fiction may be, this must be different from the nature of our response to real-life events and people. It is indeed sometimes made a constitutive element in accounts of the correct attitude to works of fiction that the response is different-that we are not, as the phrase goes, 'personally involved'. In one way this suggestion i s platitudinous but unhelpful; in another it is false. No one, presumably, wishes to deny that our response to art has dimensions which are of a different order from our response to life, and vice versa: that is not the point at issue. It is the respects in which our response to art seems to 'match' our response to life that concerns us now. It would be pointless to restrict 'being moved' to 'being moved by real life situations' simply because those dimensional differences exist. So much for the unhelpful aspect of the suggestion. Seen in another way, however, the suggestion might be that when it is said that we are 'not really moved' this must be taken to imply that we are under the illusion of being moved. This seems to just be false. The claim here may be that since we know we are dealing with fiction which presents events as if they were happening or had happened, and persons as if they exist or had existed, we are not in fact really moved by them but only behave emotionally as if we were. But whilst this claim leaves (A) and (B) intact in asserting that we are not really moved, presumably because we cannot be, there must surely be something wrong with the redescription of the 'fact' which amounts to denying that emotional responses to fiction such as anger, horror, fear, dismay, outrage, pity, compassion an joy are possible. Nobody who merely simulates these emotions or believes that we all do so is a party to the present discussion.
(4) What is wrong with the suggestion just canvassed is the idea that our responses to fiction are not what they seem. Perhaps we ought, then, to say that the response is what it seems-we do react as we seem to-but what this implies is not as it seems. That is to say these emotional responses amount simply to behaving as if we believed in the existence of something when in fact we do not do so. But this gets us
nowhere. For what posed our problem is just how we can respond in this way even when the disclaimer is made. That emotions, the 'emotions of life' to use Clive Bell's phrase, are felt is then not an illusion or misrepresentation of the facts: only the belief conditions become problematical. And in that case the alleged puzzle remains.
(5) All the same a person can behave as if something were the case without believing it, and then (supposing he is not acting in that way deliberately) we might say his behaviour is in some way irrational or inappropriate. That would be one account of how we can be moved by fiction and still retain (A) and (B): it is just a psychological fact about ourselves which remains inexplicable at least on the level or rational discourse. For what we are to say now is not that belief is a necessary condition of being moved tout court, but a necessary condition of being moved rationally or appropriately or reasonably.
To be moved by fiction is to be moved irrationally, inappropriately or unreasonably.
It is of course a commonplace that people are sometimes prone to fears or premonitions for which they themselves admit to having no reasonable basis in fact. That they should make such admissions and still be prey to the fears and premonitions is, we might say, just what being irrational in these cases amounts to. But there is a large gulf between that sort of case and our response to fiction. I might reasonably try to persuade someone in real life that his fears were somehow groundless or unjustified; and indeed, within the context of a play, for instance, I might reasonably try to persuade someone that his fears with regard to the intentions of one character towards another were also groundless (because, for example, he had misconstrued the way the plot was developing).
But it would not be reasonable for me to try to persuade him out of his fears or any of the 'emotions of life' which are felt towards characters and events in fiction simply because that is what they are: just characters and events in fiction. Such a response is not, I
suggest, a deplorable state of affairs calling for elimination or cure rather than explanation.
(6) So far I have expressed dissatisfaction with a number of accounts of our response to fiction which hope to remove the puzzling element in it: suggestions about seeing that response in terms of illusory emotions or illusory objects (3); or illusory beliefs (5) or modes of irrational behaviour (5) are equally unsatisfactory. Seen against the background of these kinds of approach, suspension of disbelief in the characters and events which confront us in fiction seems to offer us a prima facie more attractive solution of the puzzle we began with, if not the only one. For if belief, or disbelief, is not suspended, it might be argued, either we cannot genuinely be moved (B) or we hold contradictory beliefs about fictional characters and events. gains plausibility only if we assume that there is a requirement that being genuinely moved presupposes holding beliefs about the objects of such emotions, and the notion of suspension of disbelief meets this requirement. In order to have relevant beliefs, it is said, we must first suspend disbelief. But if we interpret the situation as involving illusion in any case, we just do not believe in the objects and the position is undermined. Equally stultifying is the reading of 'suspension of disbelief' as involving mere illusory beliefs (cf. (4)). Resorting to imaginary beliefs with make-believe just round the corner robs the proposition of most of its appeal.
(8) Fiction aside, the situations in which I might ordinarily suspend belief or disbelief in something would be of this kind. I suspend belief in p, say, where I begin to suspect that there is some reason for believing that not-p might be the case. Conversely, suspending disbelief in p might be the consequence of some new evidence which has come to hand for believing that p might after all be the case. Perhaps in such situations it would be more accurate to say that I suspend judgment until swayed one way or the other by the evidence. In any case suspension of disbelief does not ordinary leave knowledge claims (if any) intact: they are clearly suspended too. If I started off believing that I had £5, and this belief was grounded on my knowledge that the purse in my pocket contained that amount, then the suspicion, whilst I am walking in a crowded street, that my pocket has just been picked makes me not only suspend my belief but also my knowledge claim until I have a chance to investigate. Conversely, my disbelieving that there is a burglar next door since I claim to know that there is nobody in the room (I looked a while ago, and the room was empty) may be suspended on hearing footsteps coming from there: but my knowledge claim too is held in abeyance until I have had another look or until I can clearly locate the footsteps as coming from downstairs.
(9) This completely unmysterious reading of suspending belief or disbelief does not help us when we come to fictional characters and events. For here, apparently, suspending disbelief is supposed to work whilst yet we know that something or other is not the case: a work of fiction, it is alleged, makes us willingly suspend our disbelief in the reality of what is presented. But if this is supposed to be the disbelief entailed by our knowing that we are dealing with fiction and that the characters and events are not real, (11) The use of examples from the stage might be thought unnecessarily to complicate the discussion here, since we have, in addition to the spectator-work relationship, the fiction being played out by actors on the stage. So difficulties are going to arise at more than one level. But drama is the case more often cited when suspension of disbelief is discussed, and it is certainly the area where the problems I am dealing with most strikingly arise in contrast to the reading of a novel or the viewing of a narrative or representational painting. The complexity of the dramatic situation will in any case have to be taken care of in any account one gives.
(12) Amongst the many true beliefs I have when currently watching a performance of Richard III is the belief that Richard III is not now alive and engaged in some action; the belief that I am watching a stage play (whether or not I know who it is by); the belief that Sir John Guilgud (or whoever), or some anonymous actor, is now playing the part of Richard III. The second and third of the beliefs no doubt entail the first, and all three are entailed by the knowledge that we are dealing with fiction and presuppose some familiarity with dramatic conventions in some cultural setting. These and other true beliefs of a similar nature can all be expressed, if desired, in terms of disbelief: i.e. disbelief that Richard III is now alive, that fifteenth-century events are taking place before us, that the historical King Richard is on a stage, and so on. But if these are the disbeliefs to be suspended, then so far from removing our puzzle it compounds it. For these are all beliefs or disbeliefs which are entailed by what we not only justly claim to know, but must know in order to have any appropriate response to the work at all. To give up or temporarily set aside these knowledge claims and their entailed beliefs (or disbeliefs) would be to attribute to the observer an attitude so naïve or childlike as scarcely to be describable in terms of his being genuinely moved by fictional events and characters in any sense that could seriously engage our attention: he could simply be described as being easily taken in. (And when the delusion is removed, such a person would presumably no longer want to be described as having been genuinely moved at all.) It must be clear, I hope, that these very knowledge claims have to be left intact for the situation to be properly described as one in which the willing suspension of disbelief could be considered at all as some kind of short-hand explanation or one step in a truncated justificatory argument. But so far I have not been able to give it a sense which escapes logical absurdity, not even one compensating for that by some gain in psychological plausibility.
(13) In case my remarks so far seem unduly laboured, it might be useful to interpolate some remarks about H. H. Price's treatment of beliefs in aesthetic contexts. 'It would be generally agreed,' Price says, 'that if we are to appreciate a novel or a play
there must be what Coleridge calls a 'willing suspension of disbelief'" (Belief, p.307). He provides no discussion or argument in support of this claim, but apparently thinks it at least an 'intelligent' attitude to fiction. But clearly he is not happy with it, no doubt because he feels, though obscurely, the pressure of the puzzle I began with. There are some people, he says, for whom this suspension of disbelief is not enough. That is to say, many people, whom he is inclined to characterize as highly civilized or highly intelligent, are content to suspend disbelief: for them it is sufficient to follow a story with interest and attention, in a neutral state of neither belief nor disbelief, suspended between commitment either way. Other people, however, whom he describes as 'more naïve or less hard-headed', find this mere suspension of disbelief 'too cold and too neutral an attitude', which detracts from their enjoyment of the story they are reading or the play they are seeing. These people are supposed to be in a state of what he calls 'half-belief' which resembles belief but isn't full belief. Behind this bit of psychology of art, perhaps, is a nod in the direction of aesthetic attitude theories which resolutely exclude 'interest' and concern with the emotions of life, and an awareness that this is not in fact how many people respond to art. More importantly, it betrays a conceptual discomfort. Suspension of disbelief, Price must recognize, does not allow for emotional response to art of the kind I am talking about. His 'intelligent' attention to fiction precludes being genuinely moved by the characters and events in fiction, and behind such a view must lie the idea that some belief conditions must surely be fulfilled for emotional engagement to be possible (cf. my (B earlier.) But when Price comes to take account of the emotional response to fiction he cannot deal with it except on the level of semi-delusion. Hence it is the more naïve or less hardheaded readers and listeners who get 'carried away' by fictional happenings into a state resembling belief-apparently half-believing that they are really happening here and now, for only in that way can the emotional response be explained. Thus half-belief is not genuine belief, though someone in that state may show 'the emotional symptoms of belief', such as being moved to tears. Half-belief is, moreover, tenuous, quickly fading, easily 'thrown off' and liable to be overtaken by more normal beliefs or disbeliefs. Since they are neither real beliefs nor real disbeliefs, halfbeliefs do not lead to real interference in what is half-believed in. So Price obviously recognizes that real beliefs, however temporarily, in the evens, say, on the stage as now really happening, could hardly be squared with the action-inhibited character of even the most 'carried-away' emotional response.
In Price's account there is nothing to distinguish this psychological state of halfbeliefs in aesthetic contexts from the half-belief which, he says, occurs in religious attitudes, superstition or children's make-believe. The psychological account is the same.
Price speaks of half-belief in whatever context as a 'queer state': it is a sign of a not fully integrated and fully mature personality; but then, he tells us, none of us is fully integrated or fully mature all the time. Half-beliefs are something we are reluctant to acknowledge having because we are normally half-ashamed of them.
All this, I submit, is of no help at all in trying to sort out the nature of our response to fiction. Nothing is gained by allowing suspension of disbelief to be in order but precluding an emotional response, or alternatively allowing a response but only as a pardonable yet hardly reasonable outcome of queer states in half-belief indistinguishable in psychological character from superstition and make-believe. We are not dealing with mild symptoms of mental derangement. In fact, when we turn to Price's examples of aesthetic half-belief, we find, I think, that his discussion merely takes us to the point where my discussion began. Thus a man is said to be moved by a performance of Hamlet, and his emotions are said to be genuine and not pretended emotions, but at the same time they are said to be 'not wholly serious'. But if we ask, what that amounts to, the only answer apparently is that they are not wholly serious simply because they are responses to fiction. And that leaves everything as it was before.
(14) Earlier I suggested that knowledge claims with their antecedent beliefs must be left standing i f the situation which gives rise to the puzzle to be resolved by suspension of disbelief is to arise at all. Price, I think, is inclined to exclude half-belief with its attendant emotional involvement from our contemplation of paintings but I, on the contrary, am inclined to say the principle involved is the same even in connection with narrative paintings. Take, for instance, Giotto's fresco of The Slaughter of the Innocents in the Capella degli Scrovegni at Padau. Certainly we are under no illusion about what we see here: a painted wall depicting a scene. But we may nevertheless be moved, even to outrage or indignation. Being able to supply 'Herod presiding over a massacre' as a description of what one responds to is based moreover on certain true beliefs about the painted wall, artistic conventions and artistic intentions: all these are entailed by one's knowing that one is facing a fresco and not a blood bath. Clearly the emotional response here does not imply that we are being naïvely carried away.
Responses such as these, I would be prepared to argue, are indeed not only compatible with, but actually demanded by, one's evaluation of some works as great art. It is at least conceivable-and in the case of our example perhaps even certain-that the artist intended just that kind of reaction.
(15) If, then, in this sort of way the disbeliefs entailed by the knowledge that one is watching a play, viewing a fresco or, let's ad, reading a novel, are to be held in suspense, we could not describe what we are being moved by in terms which are at all appropriate. If on the other hand we take it that it is as a consequence of the beliefs involved in our knowing that we are dealing with fiction, and not despite these beliefs, that we can adequately describe the objects of our emotion, the puzzle may disappear.
The invitation, that is to say, to suspend these beliefs or disbeliefs seems to be based on a muddle. It insinuates that a genuine response must somehow be in conflict with what we actually believe or know. As against this I am inclined to think that the beliefs which one holds about the objects of our emotions in a play, a painting or a novel, and which are indeed presupposed by those emotions, are not only in conflict with the beliefs we have about its being a novel or a play and so on that we are responding to, but can arise only because these latter beliefs are held in the first place. be a play, a novel, a painting and so on we have a perfectly serviceable analogue to the space-time co-ordinates which ordinarily allow for the determination of the truth value of declarative sentences. In this obvious sense, the second-order beliefs are true or false according to whether they are correctly or incorrectly identified within the analogue.
A second observation reinforces this one and takes us beyond the coordinates of the text-using 'text' now in the wide sense of whatever it is that provides referents for first-order beliefs about fiction and analogues of space and time for second-order beliefs.
The audience at a play, the reader of a novel, the observer of a painting may have beliefs about the characters presented or depicted which he might be prepared to state in There are of course significant differences between dream persons and fictional ones-as there are between dreaming and constructing a publicly available work of fiction-differences which, in the case of works of fiction seen from the standpoint of the audience or reader, demand both first-and second-order beliefs in order to account for our involvement in those works; whereas in the case of dreams a description of having been involved in them does not need, and could only be confused by, the attempt to elicit any such underlying belief structure. (21) The proposal that they must be beliefs about such physical things, if they are to be well founded at all, stems from the idea that this is required by the truism that events and characters in fiction have no identity outside and apart from the work in which they are mentioned or depicted. Rather than attributing imaginary or fictional existence to them, thus introducing problematic kinds of existence, it has sometimes been supposed that names and other referring expressions had to have a special use when employed in the context of fiction: that is to say, that they had to include as part of their meaning a reference to the play or whatever in which they occurred. On that view someone who believed that a certain thing is true of, say, Anna Karenina would have to include in it a specific reference to the fact that Tolstoy wrote a book of that name, or something of that sort. This I believe to be a mistake: it is not part of what someone believes in the secondorder beliefs I have introduced that the meaning of the referring phrases or proper names should be special in that sense at all, any more than it is part of the meaning of the man I dreamt of or the baby I hoped for that I dreamt of him or hoped for her. to fictional characters and events already involve assumptions of a sophisticated kind about the work. That is to say, although a work of fiction may be embodied in a physical object with physical and directly perceptible qualities, we cannot ascribe to it the properties relevant to its being a work of fiction-any more than those relevant to its being a work of art anyway-unless we understand a cultural context and certain conventions. Whilst a given work may be extensionally defined by reference to physical objects, qua work of fiction it can only be intensionally defined by reference to the meaning of ' fiction', to which an understanding of the cultural conventions and expectations is essential. These intensional constraints on identifying things as works of fiction of the culture-relative type are usually taken for granted to the point what we assume them as given when we go to the theatre or an art gallery, or when we read a play or a novel. Nevertheless, when we are in situations like this we have already accepted that when we identify something as a work of fiction we do so under descriptions which meet these requirements. To discuss how that comes about would be to engage in an inquiry about the status of works of art, including works of fiction, in relation to certain kinds of institution-the 'art work' of much recent debate. All I can do here is acknowledge that constraints are necessary. inherently paradoxical notion; it is also quite unnecessary in an account of the way we respond to fiction.
